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Abstract
There are large cross-national differences in the percentage of women in legislatures. Institutional arrangement
is a considerable explanatory factor in the disparity in women’s representation, and many mechanisms have
been implemented to increase parity. Within PR systems, electoral systems are a way to try to increase the
representation of women. Previous studies have linked thresholds to increased party magnitude and in turn to
increased women’s representation, but there have not been extensive studies to directly link thresholds to
women’s representation. This paper analyzes the impact of thresholds directly, finding that the relationship
between thresholds and women’s representation is not as strong or as direct as assumed within the previous
literature.
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Leveling the Playing Field: Electoral Thresholds and the Representation of
Women
Tracy Quinlan
There are large cross-national differences in the percentage of women in legislatures.
Institutional alTangement is a considerable explanatory factor in the disparity in
women's representation, and many mechanisms have been implemented to increase
parity. Within PR systems, electoral systems are a way to try to increase the repre-
sentation of women. Previous studies have linked thresholds to increased party mag-
nitude and in turn to increased women's representation, but there have not been
extensive studies to directly link thresholds to women's representation. This paper
analyzes the impact of thresholds directly, finding that the relationship between
thresholds and women's representation is not as strong or as direct as assumed within
the previous literature.
General Situation of Women in Parliaments
Women make up more than half of the world's population, but as of August 31, 2003,
compose only 15.3% of the elected representatives to national legislatures (IPU). A large
discourse has emerged trying to explain this under representation, and a debate has devel-
oped about what variables have the greatest explanatory value. The political culture side
of the argument claims that without certain socio-economic conditions, educational stan-
dards, or feminist movements the representation of women can be severely limited. It is
only in more egalitarian societies that women obtain respected elected offices.
Institutionalists, on the other hand, stress that institutions do make a difference. Without
woman-friendly electoral systems, such as proportional representation, the success of
women vying for political office can be greatly hindered. Even if a society is progressive
and women have extensive rights, institutions can limit or expand representation. Not all
proportional electoral systems are created equal. Various institutional "tweaks" can alter
the woman-friendliness of a system. Electoral thresholds provide a strong example of how
particular rules can affect the membership of a governing body. There is debate regarding
the effect and importance of thresholds, and this paper adds to that discourse by directly
examining the impact of thresholds on women.
An electoral threshold is the percentage of votes that must be achieved in order to
gain access to the legislature. The relationship between thresholds and women's represen-
tation has not been conclusively studied. In theory, high electoral thresholds are seen to
decrease the number of parties admitted to the legislature, thereby increasing party magni-
tude and women's representation. At the same time, low electoral thresholds may be
important to women's representation. Low thresholds allow new, small parties access to
the legislature. These parties may be leftist and friendly to women, such as Green parties,
and increase the number of women brought into the legislature. Despite these conflicting
theories, there has not been a study directly examining the linkage between electoral
threshold and women's representation. Does such a relationship exist? And if there is a
relationship, why should we even care and what does that imply? The answers to these
questions are extremely important, especially since electoral thresholds are institutional
mechanisms that are relatively easy to change. I hypothesize that the higher the electoral
threshold, the greater the representation of women in a legislature. I choose not to argue
that low thresholds are more woman-friendly because while they may allow access for
small women friendly leftist parties, there is just as big of a chance that these small parties
may be of the extreme right wing conservative variety.
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The Importance of Women in Legislatures
There sometimes seems to be a temptation to brush off gender equality as something
that is nice, but not essential. If the electorate chooses all representatives, then each legis-
lator is endowed with the responsibility of representing each constituent regardless of sex,
race, or economic standing. This logic inherently assumes that no differences exist in the
policy goals and implementation strategies of men and women. However, this is not the
case. Women do have specific policy goals and priorities that generally differ from men.
The increase of women in the US House of Representatives, for example, has led to
increased funds for research on women's health issues, increased domestic violence and
sexual assault services, and legislation seeking to improve gender equity in education
(Thomas, 1998). Women also bring a different type of leadership style into politics.
Female legislators tend to be more consensual and open to cooperation than men (Carey,
Niemi, and Powell, 1998), allowing for legislation that is more representative of the goals
of many different people. Women compose half of the electorate, have different strategies
for obtaining goals, and place emphasis on particular policy issues. The gender break-
down of a governing body, therefore, is extremely important.
It has also been argued that in order for an institution to be truly democratic, it must
represent all citizens without regard to race, gender, or class (Thomas, 1998). In other
words, legitimate authority will only exist if the governing body reflects the breakdown of
the larger society. It is important, therefore, for democratic institutions to be welcoming to
minority groups, including women. Increased representation of women provides an exam-
ple of egalitarianism for children currently growing up (Thomas, 1998), as well as estab-
lishes the beginning of essential social and business networks for women in the future
(Rhode, 2003). The importance of women in political and leadership positions is not to be
underestimated.
Factors Affecting Representation in Parliaments
Institutions
The overwhelming majority of literature claims that institutions make a strong and
significant impact on the gender composition of a governing body. Generally, proportional
representation systems are found to be most advantageous to women (Rule 1981, and
1987). In PR systems, district magnitude (the number of seats available within a district)
is far greater than in single member district or first past the post systems. Increased dis-
trict magnitude allows party gatekeepers the opportunity to balance party lists (Darcy,
Welch, and Clark, 1994). Driven by the incentive of appealing to a wide array of voters
through a diverse party list, party gatekeepers are more likely to nominate women than
they would be in single member districts where the winner takes all. When there is more
than one seat, women are seen as less risky. The two houses of the Australian legislature
are an extreme example of the impact of proportional representation. In Australia, the
House is traditionally composed almost exclusively of men, while the Senate has better
female representation. The cause for this is almost definitely the electoral law which man-
dates an absolute majority for House seats, but a closed list PR for the Senate. Closed
party lists give more incentive for ticket balancing by the party leadership and a greater
chance for women to gain elected office.
There are, however, many different breeds of proportional representation, and other
aspects of the chosen electoral systems can affect the demographics of the legislature
(Riedwyl and Steiner, 1995). PR is friendliest to women when there is a high district mag-
nitude. High district magnitude allows for more than one representative from a district. In
US state legislatures, district magnitude has a considerable positive effect on the represen-
tation of women, even if the states have differing political cultures (Matiand and Brown,
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1992). District magnitude also affects PR systems. If there is only one candidate in a dis-
trict, then each party can only run one candidate, effectively making it an SMD election,
and providing party gatekeepers with a reason to weed out a lot of women (Matland and
Montgomery, 2003). Large district magnitudes-even districts only a seat or two larger-
positively effect the election of women (Engstrom 1987).
Party magnitude (the number of seats won by a particular party within a given dis-
trict) also has an effect on the composition of a governing body. High party magnitude
gives party gatekeepers the opportunity to reach further down their party lists in seat allo-
cation. Women tend to occupy these positions, because the more attractive top slots on a
party list go to the party leadership, who tend to be men. High party magnitude thus
increases the chance that women will be allocated a seat. In some case studies, party mag-
nitude has been found to be a better predictor of women's representation than district mag-
nitude (Matland, 1993). Although the effect is not constant, the importance of party mag-
nitude makes logical sense. If a party is awarded more seats, then it can reach further
down its party list to the positions women are more likely to occupy.
Electoral thresholds are a variation to PR systems that have the ability to change rep-
resentation. If a threshold is high, it can reduce the number of parties that gain access to
the legislature (Moraski and Loewenberg, 1999) causing party magnitude to increase by
reducing party system fragmentation. For example, when thresholds were increased in
Latvia from 4% to 5%, only four parties won ten or greater seats in the legislature. In
Hungary, the raising of electoral thresholds from 4% to 5% kept twelve small parties out
of parliament (Moraski and Loewenberg, 1999), thus increasing party magnitude. A rea-
sonable threshold that increases party magnitude but does not completely eliminate the
overall proportionality of a multiple party system seems to be the best structure for
women.
Political culture
The main rival explanation for levels of female representation is political culture.
Social attitudes and expectations of women can influence women's representation in many
ways. If a particular culture is more traditional, then women may be less likely to enter
into the political game. Several different methods exist to measure political culture; proxy
variables and values surveys are two of the most common. Using the proxy variable of
religion, Andrew Reynolds (1999) finds that there is a relationship between religious orien-
tation and the prevalence of women in the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment. Another study focuses on five socioeconomic factors to create a proxy analysis.
The cultural variable was measured using religion, ratification of the UN Convention on
the Elimination of AU Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and a dummy variable
regarding the legality of abortion. However, Kenworthy and Malami (1999) found no sig-
nificant relationship between political culture and women's representation. The only
socio-economic variable that made a distinct effect on the number of female legislators
was the percentage of professional occupations held by women. While KenwOlthy and
Malami did not find a relationship between a women's movement and better representation
of women in a legislature, Saxonberg did (2000). The low number of women in eastern
European parliaments is explained in part due to the lack of a women's movement. Unlike
Western Europe, the East has not experienced a strong feminist push on political parties
for greater women's involvement within legislatures.
The use of proxy variables is helpful, but they fail to truly test the effect of political
culture and citizen's attitudes. Norris and Inglehart (2000, 2001) instead employ World
Values Surveys to the political culture question. Questions regarding feelings about
women in general, as well as women in high-power positions, were employed. With
access to better data, NOlTis and Inglehart were able to conclude that culture does matter,
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and the more egalitarian cultures that are typically found in postindustrial nations makes
policy reforms easier to implement. For non-postindustrial nations, there is hope. In these
societies, younger women have more egalitarian views, which suggests that eventually
more equal representation is possible. However, political culture does not have a strong
enough explanatory factor to work independently. Reynolds (1999) calls cultural variables
such as religion a "foundation" that woman-friendly political institutions can be built on to
further advance the representation of women.
While the political culture argument of women's representation is intriguing, it has
major limitations. A society may be extremely egalitarian and supportive to women in
high office, but if the rules of the game do not allow candidates that are different from the
status quo, their success will be constrained. Furthermore, political culture is extremely
difficult to change. Its value as an explanatory factor can be analyzed, but what happens
next? There is an explanation, but it is hard to use it to apply to change a current situation.
Political culture is very stable in comparison to more flexible institutions. Institutions can
be changed. They can be tailored to a nation to achieve a particular balance or proportion-
ality in a legislative chamber, and the impact of an institutional change can be felt rather
quickly. Due the limitation of political culture, it is best to use it as a control variable
when measuring the effect of particular institutions on women's representation.
Research Design
In analyzing the effect of electoral thresholds on women's representation, it is impor-
tant to select cases that have a range from low to high in both representation and thresh-
olds. Since electoral thresholds are tools employed exclusively in proportional representa-
tion elections, majoritarian systems were not included. Mixed systems are included, but
the competitive party, district magnitude, and party magnitude data represents only results
from the PR proportion of the legislature. The cases were further limited by location.
Only European nations, including post-communist Eastern Europe and Russia, are used in
this analysis. Selecting European countries limits the cases to a specific region, while at
the same time allowing for variance in levels of democracy, specific electoral rules, and
women's representation. The electoral results for each nation are the most current data
available. In cases where the electoral threshold has changed (Croatia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia), election results since 1990 are used. The level of analy-
sis, therefore, is an election under a particular set of threshold rules. In most of the
Westem European cases, that means a single data point; but in cases like Croatia, the elec-
toral rules have changed in each post-communist election. Thirty-seven cases are evaluat-
ed (Table I).
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the percentage of women in the legislature (Table I). Data for
the lower chamber is used if the institution is bicameral, and the primary data source is the
Intemational Parliamenta[y Union. If the electoral system is mixed, only data for the pro-
portional representation portion of the legislature was used.
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Table 1: Cases and Dependent Variable
DV:% DV:%
Women's Women's
Case representation Case representation
Austria 33.9 Lithuania 2: 1996 & 2000 12.86
Bulgaria 26.2 Luxembourg 16.7
Croatia 1: 1992 3 Netherlands 36.7
Croatia 2: 1995 8.75 Norway 36.4
Croatia 3: 2000 20.5 Poland 1: 1991 13
Cyprus 10.7 Poland 2: 1993 12
Czech Republic 17 Poland 3: 1997 13
Denmark 38 Poland 4: 2001 20.2
Estonia 18.8 Portugal 19.1
Finland 37.5 Russia 7.6
Germany 34.5 Slovakia 9.2
Greece 8.7 Slovenia 1: 1992 6.8
Hungary 1: 1990 10.47 Slovenia 2: 2000 12.2
Hungary 2: 1994-2002 8 Spain 28.3
Iceland 30.2 Sweden 45.3
Italv 18 Switzerland 23
Latvia 21 Turkev 4.4
Liechtenstein 12 Ukraine 6.66
Lithuania 1: 1992 7.1 Sources: Intel7lational Parliamentary Union
(2003) and Matland & Montgomery (2003)
Independent variables
The primary independent variable is electoral threshold. Appendix 1 contains data on
the size and type of threshold in each of the thilty-seven cases. Due to the differing types
of thresholds and different sizes of thresholds in multiple rounds of seat allocation, an
index was created to assist in coding electoral thresholds. The scale ranges from one to
seven, with one representing zero or very minimal thresholds, and seven representing
thresholds of 11 % or greater. Since the literature implies that thresholds will increase
women's representation by increasing party magnitude, cases with multiple thresholds
were coded with the idea of how much the threshold ought to decrease party fragmenta-
tion. Appendix 1 also contains the threshold code assigned to each case, as well as the
scale.
The literature relating women's representation to thresholds hinges on the level of
party magnitude. Party magnitude is the number of seats a political party wins in a partic-
ular district. This can be extremely difficult to measure in nations that have multiple
rounds of seat allocation. It is also difficult to obtain district level data for thilty-seven dif-
ferent cases. Party magnitude, therefore, is measured simply by dividing the district mag-
nitude by the number of competitive parties. District magnitude is defined as the number
of seats in a district, and is measured by the number of PR seats divided by the total num-
ber of districts. Parties garnering ten PR seats in the election qualify as a competitive
party.
Measuring the third independent variable, political culture, can be done in several dif-
ferent ways. Socio-economic factors, education, and feelings towards government all are
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Figure 1: World Values Survey Questions
• When jobs are scarce, men have more of a right to
jobs then women
I=agree
2=neither (supplied by respondent)
3=disagree
• Women can find fulfillment only through children
I=need children for fulfillment
2=not necessary
• Being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay
I=Strongly Agree
2=Agree
3=Disagree
4=Strongly Disagree
• Is divorce justifiable?
Scale: I-neverto lO-always
involved in the political cul-
ture of a particular state. In
this case, the aspect of political
culture that is most germane
are feelings and attitudes
towards women in society
(Figure I). In a similar man-
ner to Norris and Inglehart
(2001), an index has been cre-
ated based on responses from
World Value Survey data. The
average response of individu-
als in each nation is used in
compiling the scale. The polit-
ical culture scale ranges from
four (most traditionalistic) to
eighteen (most progressive).
More progressive nations are
expected to have higher levels
of women's representation because the citizenry is more comfortable with the idea of
women in the workforce and in positions of power. Ideally, a direct measure of the accept-
ance of women in positions of political leadership would be employed. However, due to
limited survey responses on questions directly relating women and political office, ques-
tions instead were selected to gage the freedom that women have in several different roles.
Due to the large number of cases, employing a straight comparative cases method is
not practical. Instead, bivariate statistics are used to determine if a relationship exists
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. If the literature is correct,
there should be a positive relationship between electoral thresholds and party magnitude,
as well as between party magnitude and women's representation. By comparing the
results of these relationships with the relationship between electoral thresholds and
women's representation, it can be determined if the threshold is having the effect on
women's representation. Political culture is used as a control variable so that the relation-
ship between the institutional arrangements and female representation can be analyzed
without interference from culture.
Data Analysis and Results
The preliminary analyses of the raw data do not look particularly promising. The theory is
not consistently shown. According to the theory, the larger the threshold, the greater the
representation of women. Countries in which the electoral threshold has increased in elec-
tion cycles, therefore, would expect to have women's representation figures greater than in
the previous election. A quick look at the data for Croatia does not entirely support this
theory. As seen in Figure 2, when the threshold increases, women's representation increas-
es as well. But when the threshold is dropped in the next election cycle, the percentage of
women represented in the legislature decreases.
The example of Croatia is not unique. Each theorized institutional relationship is sta-
tistically insignificant (Figure 3). Of the institutional relationships, the strongest is
between the percentage of women in PR seats and the number of competitive parties. This
suggests that women's representation is greater when fewer parties enter the legislature,
which is consistent with theories relating women's representation, thresholds, and party
magnitude. However, the lack of a statistically significant relationship between party mag-
nitude and electoral threshold is interesting. The motivation for implementing thresholds
is to weed out small parties in order to prevent them from participating in the allocation of
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Figure 2
25
20 £./15 /"10 ~.5
. ..-
<.s, ....•.,.,.,.,....
0
Croatia 1 Croatia 2 Croatia 3
1.......... % women's rep 3 8.75 20.5
I Threshold 2 5 3
seats. Not only is this relationship statistically insignificant, at -0.035, it has low substan-
tive significance that actually shows a relationship opposite to what the theory predicts.
The only variable that is statistically significant is culture. The original intent of the
project was to use culture as a control
variable, but culture proved to have a
stronger relationship to women's rep-
resentation then choice of political
institution. Political culture is statisti-
cally significant at the 0.004 level.
45% of the variance in women's repre-
sentation is explained by through the
culture measure. Since the institution-
al variables did not correlate in the
proper direction or at a significant
level by themselves, further analysis to
weed out any interference caused by
political culture in these hypothesized
relationships was not necessary.
Figure 3
Pearson Significance
Con'elation (l-tailed test)
Women's
representation -0.29 0.054
and Thresholds
Women's
representation and
Party Magnitude -0.24 0.D77
Women's
representation and
Competitive Parties 0.174 0.152
Women's
representation and
Culture 0.454 0.004*
Threshold and
Party Magnitude -0.D35 0.418
n=37
*significant at the om level
,
Conclusions
The direct relationship
between thresholds and women's rep-
resentation was not found in this
study. The causal mechanism of
thresholds decreasing the number of
competitive parties, increasing paIty
magmtude, and mcreasmg women s representatIOn appears to have been relied on and
assumed in the literature incorrectly. This project, however, is just a beginning to a greater
exploration of the effect that specific institutional rules have on women's representation.
There are several possible reasons why the data did not SUppOlt the theory, including cod-
ing of electoral thresholds and party magnitude. Both measures used are simplistic and do
not incorporate all of the nuances of slight differences between countries adequately. The
thresholds were coded on a scale from I to 7. While this allowed for variance, it also
caused somewhat of a bottleneck at levels 2 and 3. The party magnitude measure needs a
more detailed way of determining the number of districts from which to base party magni-
tude. In this study, each district was counted as one unit-whether it be a regional level
district or a national district. Multiple rounds of elections were compiled into one simplis-
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tic number. For example, a system with two rounds in which there are twenty original dis-
tricts, and then scrap vote allocation to a national district list would have received an aver-
age district magnitude of twenty-one. More sophisticated operationalization of variables
may produce results that come closer to defending the theory and have greater accuracy.
The importance of the political culture variable is a reminder that culture cannot be
ignored. Culture is responsible for explaining a large portion of variance in levels of rep-
resentation. Institutions, therefore, may have some effect, but if there is not a political cul-
ture that is supportive to women seeking equal rights and employment outside the home, it
is highly doubtful that institutional arrangement will make a difference. It is also possible
that on a largely general level political culture may help to explain the degree of party
fragmentation in a state. If political culture is largely consensual and there are not deep
cleavages, the number of political parties and the degree of ideological difference between
them may be minimized. A culture leading to fewer political parties in a party list propor-
tional representation system may be another chain that explains women's representation
levels.
If culture really is the strongest explanatory factor of women's representation, there
needs to be more research on what particular aspects of political culture lead to the great-
est parity in the composition of legislatures. More sophisticated measures of political cul-
ture need to be developed. Surveys need to be expanded to be more uniform across a uni-
verse of cases; to be effective, questions need to be more consistent. Surveys need to get
to the motivation behind responses. It is helpful to know how many respondents in a
country think that women make as good of a political leader as a man, but if parity is the
eventual goal, researchers need to understand how these values are developed and if there
is any room for change. By decreasing the reliance of researchers on theorized institution-
al mechanisms that do not consistently show relationships and increasing and expanding
the analysis of political culture, the discourse of women's representation can continue to
progress.
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Appendix 1: Thresholds and Coding
General Single Party Coalition
Case Threshold Threshold Tln'eshold Other threshold Code
Austria 0 0 0 1
Bulgaria 4% 3
Croatia I: 1992 3% 2
Croatia 2: 1995 5% 8% (blocs of 2) 11% (blocs 3+) 5
Croatia 3: 2000 5% 3
Cyprus 10% or I quota 20% (blocs of
seat +8% 2) 25% (blocs of 3+) 7
9% (bloc of 3),
Czech Republic 5% 7% (blocs of 2) 11 % (bloc of 4) 5
Denmark 0 5
Estonia 5% 3
Finland 0 1
Germanv 5% 3
Greere 3% ?
Hungary 1: 1990 4% 3
Hungary 2: 1994-2002 5% 3
Iceland 0% 1
Italy 0% 1
Latvia 5% 3
Liechtenstein 8% 5
Lithuania 1: 1992 4% 3
Lithaunia 2: 1996 & 200C 5% 7% 4
Luxembourg 0% 1
Netherlands 0.67% I
Norway 0 1
Poland 1: 1991 5% for national list 3
Poland 2: 1993 5% 8% 7% for national list 4
Poland 3: 1997 5% 8% 7% for national list 4
Poland 4: 2001 5% 8% 7% for national list 4
Portugal 0 I
Russia 5% 3
Slovakia 5% 3
Slovenia 1: 1992 3% 2
Slovenia 2: 2000 4% 3
Spain 3% 2
Sweden 4% nationally or
12% in district 7
Switzerland 0% 1
Turkey 10% 6
Ukraine 4% 3
Coding Key: No Threshold-I %=1; 2-3%=2; 4-5%=3; 6-7%=4; 8-9%=5; 10-11 %=6; >II %=7
Data Sources: Intemational Parliamentary Union Pm'line Database (2003), Matland & Montgomery
(2003), and the Lijphart Electoral Archives (2003),
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